Deck, Cary, and Nisvan Erkal. "An experimental analysis of dynamic incentives to share knowledge." Economic Inquiry 51.2 (2013): 1622-1639.

Type: Non-experimental study

Knowledge user level addressed by the literature: Individual, Organizations, Sectors.

Experience level of reader: Fundamental

KU Groups: Policy makers, Clinicians, Brokers, Manufacturers, Developers, Intermediaries, and Researchers.

Setting(s) to which the reported activities/findings are relevant:  Federal Lab, Large business, Small business, University.

Format: Peer-reviewed journal article

Annotation: This paper is the result of research experiments on joint research ventures. It continues the experimental research begun by Erkkal and Minehart in “Optimal Sharing Strategies in Dynamic Games of Research and Development” (2008). The study tests and proves a theory that cooperation between businesses stagnates as discovery progresses and the outcome becomes more lucrative. 

This article uses the Commercial Devices and Services version of the NtK Model

Barriers:

• Cooperation with the competition can threaten a participant’s competitive advantage. Experimental study
  Occurrence of finding within the model: 4.6, 7.8
• Historically, making the choice not to share findings leads to an aversion to sharing in the future. Experimental study
  Occurrence of finding within the model: NtK 4.6, 4.10
• In a potential research or technology transfer partnership, both parties must agree to share. Experimental study
  Occurrence of finding within the model: 4.4, 4.6
• Firms lagging behind in development have a financial incentive to drop out before being excluded from market monopoly, i.e. “cutting their losses”.
  Experimental study
  Occurrence of finding within the model: NtK 3.9 KTA 3.B

Carriers:                     

Knowing why firms may be reluctant to share knowledge is important for effectively encouraging cooperation.
Experimental study
Occurrence of finding within the model: NtK 2.2, 2.3

Methods:

Firms undergoing R&D do so incrementally, and firms competing for the same market monopoly decide at each phase whether or not to continue based on information about the success or failure of the competition.
Experimental study
Occurrence of finding within the model: NtK 1.5, 3.9, 4.13